At that point, the entire army would utter a battle cry to frighten their enemy. Their greatest hope of success lay in 4 factors: (a) numerical superiority, (b) surprising the Romans (via an ambush for example) or in (c) advancing quickly to the fight, or (d) engaging the Romans over heavily covered or difficult terrain where units of the fighting horde could shelter within striking distance until the hour of decision, or if possible, withdraw and regroup between successive charges. Wiley. The Romans used a variety of battle formations depending on the situation. When the enemy closed, the hastati would charge. So far the situation looked promising for the warrior host. Against these mighty resources Hannibal led from Spain an army of approximately 50,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry ... Rome's manpower reserves allowed it to absorb staggering losses yet still continue to field large armies. Some descriptions of the testudo discriminate betw… Skirmishers would be placed in front of the Roman line in order to inflict casualties on the enemy and reduce the amount of Comitatenses killed in battle. The last legion usually provided the rear force, although several recently raised units might occupy this final echelon. the situation. Other items of Roman equipment from studded sandals, to body armour, to metal helmets added to Roman advantages. Addition… These range from the Testudo formation during siege warfare, to a hollow square against cavalry attack, to mixed units of heavy foot, horse and light infantry against guerrillas in Spain, to the classic "triple line" or checkerboard patterns. Some equipment was moved by pack animals and carts. Advances in Roman tactical thinking led to the adoption of eastern-style cataphracts and mass-use of auxiliary forces as cavalry, both of which were used to address previous shortcomings of the Roman army. Instead, he relied on attacking their fortified strongpoints and devastating the zone of conflict in a methodical campaign. Brady, op. During a battle the Comitatenses legions would wait in a defensive formation while performing a shield wall. This caused the opposing Roman forces to divide and ultimately fail. Henceforth, July 18 was considered an unlucky date on the Roman Calendar. Another factor in the Romans' defeat was a treacherous defection by Arminius and his contingent.[52]. Ironically, in the final days, the bulk of the fighting was between forces composed mostly of barbarians on either side. the main force. By Sir Percy Molesworth Sykes. Against the Parthians, crushing defeats did not stop the Romans from inflicting serious defeats on the Parthians themselves, for they invaded Parthian territory several times afterwards, and though Parthia proper was never totally conquered, Rome ultimately secured a rough hegemony in the area and managed to successfully destroy Parthian forces in Mesopotamia on numerous occasions. pp. The cold, tired, wet legionnaires that slogged out of the Trebia River to form up on the river bank are but one example of how Hannibal forced or manipulated the Romans into fighting on his terms, and on the ground of his own choosing. Formations were made based on military rank. Hannibal's individual genius, the steadiness of his core troops (forged over several years of fighting together in Spain, and later in Italy) and his cavalry arm seem to be the decisive factors. Legions on a campaign typically established a strong field camp, complete with palisade and a deep ditch, providing a basis for supply storage, troop marshalling and defence. If the field of potential battle were near, the movement became more careful and more tentative. Most ancient armies deployed in shallower formations, particularly phalanx-type forces. Usually these forts would be in or near cities and villages. The third phase included the opening of the city's main gate by the cohorts which had managed to break through or scale the walls, provided the rams had not knocked the gate open. Nevertheless, an advance by its left-wing drove back the Romans, who counterattacked on the right flank and made some progress against a somewhat disorganized Macedonian left. A rallying of about 10,000 disenchanted Aeudan tribesmen (engineered by Vercingetorix's agents) created a threat in Caesar's rear, including a threat to a supply convoy promised by the allied Aeudans, and he diverted four legions to meet this danger. The other six would follow behind the first four as reserves should many men fall in battle. The maniple units would be spaced 20 yards apart, and 100 yards from the next line of manipular soldiers. Once the machinery was in motion however, the Roman infantry typically was deployed, as the main body, facing the enemy. This involved the soldiers standing side by side in ranks. [19], Breaking camp and marching. Weaknesses in organization and equipment. [58], Superb as the Gallic fighters were, chariots were already declining as an effective weapon of war in the ancient world with the rise of mounted cavalry. The battles below (see individual articles for detailed accounts) illustrate the difficulties of fighting against phalanx forces. This formation would be surrounded by soldiers on the flanks. If the principes could not break the enemy, they would retreat behind the triarii and the whole army would leave the battlefield in good order. Their wooden swords and pila were designed to be twice as heavy as their metal counterparts so that the soldiers could wield a true gladius with ease. Each line fought its own lonely battle and the last ultimately perished when the Romans reorganized for a final surge. Some scholars challenge the notion that a "mobile reserve" in the modern military sense existed in the Roman Empire, and instead argue that the shifts in an organization represent a series of field armies deployed in various areas as needed, particularly in the East. The army acted to implement policy and were not allowed to stop unless they received a command from the emperor or a decree from the senate. These Roman techniques repeatedly defeated their Germanic adversaries. Therefore, this term does not indicate a standard combat strength or composition but includes the total number of infantry, which is deployed in a single formation known as a "phalanx". These training exercises began with thrusting a wooden gladius and throwing wooden pila into a quintain (wooden dummy or stake) while wearing full armor. Roman military tactics evolved from the type of a small tribal host-seeking local hegemony to massive operations encompassing a world empire. Some historians note however that Rome often balanced brutal attrition with shrewd diplomacy, as demonstrated by Caesar's harsh treatment of Gallic tribes that opposed him, but his sometimes conciliatory handling of those that submitted. "Breaking phalanxes" illustrates more of the Roman army's flexibility. Speaking of the decline of the heavy infantry, the Roman historian Vegetius lauded the old fighting units, and lamented how the heavy armour of the early days had been discarded by the weaker, less disciplined, barbarized forces: Historian Arther Ferrill notes that even towards the end, some of the old infantry formations were still in use. [26], As the army approached its enemy, the velites in front would throw their javelins at the enemy and then retreat through the gaps in the lines. Flank and reconnaissance elements were also deployed to provide the usual covering security. An even more dramatic demonstration of Roman vulnerability is shown in the numerous wars against Parthian heavy cavalry. These tools would be used for building the castrum. Put simply, the relative disparity in the number of available troops at the outset of the conflict meant that Hannibal had a much narrower margin for error than the Romans.[9]. At the Battle of the Sabis river, (see more detailed article) contingents of the Nervii, Atrebates, Veromandui and Aduatuci tribes massed secretly in the surrounding forests as the main Roman force was busy making camp on the opposite side of the river. On June 22, 363 a large-scale clash occurred near the town of Maranga. Over time the military system changed its equipment and roles, but throughout the course of Roman history, it always remained a disciplined and professional war machine. Cavalry opponents were one of the toughest challenges faced by the Roman infantry. A tribune or other officer often accompanied the vanguard to survey the terrain for possible camp locations. Their uniquely large scuta, as the Romans’ shields were called, allowed them to present a 360-degree wall of wood to opponents. [15] See detailed battles: Views of the Gallic enemies of Rome have varied widely. The resurgence of Roman baby names is partly thanks to The Hunger Games, the futuristic book that featured Roman names for most of the male characters, partly because of the HBO series Rome , … For an in-depth analysis of ranks, types, and historical units, see Structural history of the Roman military and Roman legion for a detailed breakdown. Flavius was the family name of the 1st-century Roman emperors Vespasian, Titus and Domitian. [93] At the Battle of Châlons (circa 451 AD) Attila the Hun rallied his troops by mocking the once-vaunted Roman infantry, alleging that they merely huddled under a screen of protective shields in close formation. The above is only standard procedure and was often modified; for example, at Zama, Scipio deployed his entire legion in a single line to envelop Hannibal's army just as Hannibal had done at Cannae. [4] The soldiers in the manipular legions would be heavily spaced apart, allowing greater flexibility on the battlefield. Some soldiers also carried a type of turf cutter. For an open field conflict, the Romans would place their infantry in the middle with auxiliaries on the right and left sides. However instead of Hastati, Principes, and Triarii they used Cohorts. His victories in Spain and the African campaign demonstrated a new sophistication in Roman warfare and reaffirmed the Roman capacity to adapt, persist and overcome. Others like Severus and Trajan saw great success in their invasions of Mesopotamia, defeating Parthian armies through combined arms tactics. Combined arms and quick advance in later eras. [44] Roman sources reflect on the prejudices of their times, but nevertheless testify to the Gauls' fierceness and bravery. The basic Greek formation was made more flexible by Philip II of Macedon and his son, Alexander III the Great. Defeat by strong cavalry forces is a recurring event in Roman military history. The Romans used a variety of battle formations depending on Just before contact with the enemy, the soldiers moved in very close together so that each man's shield helped to protect the man on his left. Another is a particular attack formation, such as the wedge discussed above, or an encirclement as at the Battle of Ilipa. The camp would then be burned to the ground to prevent its later occupation and use by the enemy. The trumpets would then be sounded for a final time and then the troops were asked three times whether they were ready, to which they were expected to shout together "Ready! The opposition also failed to deploy supporting forces effectively to help the phalanx at its time of dire need. One scenario for not using gaps is deployment in a limited space, such as the top of a hill or ravine, where extensive spreading out would not be feasible. Each maniple had a trumpeteer. The soldiers in front and sides interlocked their shields. Assault roads and causeways were constructed on the marshy ground to facilitate manoeuvre, sometimes under direct Gallic attack. Historian Adrian Goldsworthy notes that such tentative pre-battle manoeuvring was typical of ancient armies as each side sought to gain the maximum advantage before the encounter. The fierceness of the Gallic and Germanic charges is often commented upon by some writers, and in certain circumstances, they could overwhelm Roman lines. In the naval sphere, the Romans followed some of the same methods they used with the infantry, dropping their ineffective designs and copying, adapting and improving on Punic warships, and introducing heavier marine contingents (infantry fighters) on to their ships. [39], The power of Roman field camps has been noted earlier, but in other actions, the Romans sometimes used trenches to secure their flanks against envelopment when they were outnumbered, as Caesar did during operations in Belgaic Gaul. While defensive configurations were sometimes used, the phalanx was most effective when it was moving forward in attack, either in a frontal charge or in "oblique" or echeloned order against an opposing flank, as the victories of Alexander the Great and Theban innovator Epaminondas attest. [65] Vercingetorix overall persisting logistics policy, however, demonstrates a significant level of strategic thinking. As historian A. Goldsworthy (2006) notes: "His [Vercingetorix's] strategy was considerably more sophisticated than that employed by Caesar's earlier opponents.."[66] At Alesia this mobile approach became overly static. Each legionary carried about 5 days' worth of wheat, pulses or chickpeas, a flask of oil, and a mess kit with a dish, cup, and utensil. Roman horsemen, while fast, were actually much too weak to cope with the very cavalry based invasions of the Huns, Goths, Vandals and Sassanids. While the drop in quality did not happen immediately, it is argued that over time, the limitanei declined into lightly armed, static watchman type troops that were of dubious value against increasing barbarian marauders on the frontiers. A large number of officers in the typical Roman army, and the flexible breakdown into sub-units like cohorts or maniples greatly aided coordination of such moves.[37]. Packed into a dense armoured mass, and equipped with massive pikes 12 to 21 feet (6.4 m) in length, the phalanx was a formidable force. Hannibal's great victory at Cannae (considered one of the greatest Roman defeats ever) was primarily an infantry struggle, but the key role was played by his cavalry, as in his other victories. He drilled his men and skirmished daily with the Romans, who had overrun a hilltop position and had created a small camp some distance from Caesar's larger main camp. The “Victorious Sixth Legion” was founded by the general Octavian (who later went … Information was gathered from spies, collaborators, diplomats and envoys, and allies. It is true that at Châlons, the Roman infantry contributed to the victory by seizing part of the battlefield's high ground. 2001. The gambit was successful. If properly organized and fighting together a long time under capable leaders, they could be very proficient. When the Romans faced phalangite armies, the legions often deployed the velites in front of the enemy with the command to contendite vestra sponte (attack), presumably with their javelins, to cause confusion and panic in the solid blocks of phalanxes. Field army: a grouping of several legions and auxiliary cohorts, Non-combatant support: generally the men who tended the mules, forage, watering and sundries of the baggage train, Consul – an elected official with military and civic duties; like a co-president (there were two), but also a major military commander. After a long battle, the Persians withdrew- a tactical victory (albeit a costly one for the Romans according to some historians). The Romans themselves had retained some aspects of the classical phalanx (not to be confused with the Macedonian phalanx) in their early legions, most notably the final line of fighters in the classic "triple line", the spearmen of the triarii. The tribes of Europe did not have a state or economic structure able to support lengthy campaigns and therefore could often (but not always) be made to change their minds about opposing Roman hegemony. Their ineffectiveness was demonstrated at Cannae and Adrianople; in both instances, the cavalry was completely destroyed by a vastly more powerful enemy horse. Four of the cohorts would line up on the battle line and lead. Skirmishing could get out of hand, launching both main forces towards one another. It had soldiers lining up in the shape of a pointy triangle and charging directly at and through the enemy. tortoise. At the hour of decision, the enemy phalanx advanced in formidable array against the Roman line and made some initial progress. Copyright © 2000-2019 All Rights Reserved History Source LLC. Cæsar: a history of the art of war among the Romans Down to the End of the Roman Empire. [12] Legionaries were trained to thrust with their gladii because they could defend themselves behind their large shields (scuta) while stabbing the enemy. Along with Cyrus and Julius, other Roman boy names in the US Top 1000 include Atticus, Felix, Justus, Titus, Cassius, Linus, Magnus, … He ordered his troops to ignore them and to attack the powerful Alans and Visigoths instead. A later Gallic attack against the Roman camp was routed. On occasion, a legion would have ballista, or a piece of field artillery that threw large arrows. Numerous scholarly histories of the Roman military machine note the huge numbers of men that could be mobilized, more than any other Mediterranean power. Part of the army might be led out of the camp and drawn up in battle array towards the enemy. Cohort VI: Made up of "The Finest of the Young Men". [44] The 4 conditions above were in their favour: (a) numerical superiority, (b) the element of surprise, (c) a quick advance/assault, and (d) favourable terrain that masked their movements until the last minute. Supreme command of either legion or army was by consul or proconsul or a praetor, or in cases of emergency in the republican era, a dictator. The next line could then attack the enemy. Compared to the tightly packed spearmen of the phalanx, the Roman heavy infantry, through their training and discipline, and operating in conjunction with light foot and cavalry, could quickly adopt a number of methods and formations depending on the situation. These defensive measures, used in concert with the cavalry charge led by Caesar himself, broke the Gauls and won the battle—and therefore the war—for good. As with most armed forces, a variety of traders, hucksters, prostitutes and other miscellaneous service providers trailed in the wake of the Roman fighting men.[17]. Deployed too early, and they might get entangled in the frontal fighting and become exhausted. Nevertheless, some historians emphasize that the final demise of Rome was due to military defeat, however plausible (or implausible) the plethora of theories advanced by some scholars, ranging from declining tax bases, to class struggle, to mass lead poisoning. An extended set-piece slogging match between the lightly armed tribesmen and the well-organized heavy legionaries usually spelt doom for the tribal fighters. Using these he was able to defeat the Romans twice, with a third battle deemed inconclusive or a limited Roman tactical success by many scholars. Without such long-term cohesion and leadership, however, their performance was uneven. Any history of the Roman infantry must grapple with the factors that led to the decline of the heavy legions that once dominated the Western world. Marcellinus's commentary also sharply contrasts the fighting spirit of the Persian infantrymen with those of Rome, stating that they had "aversion to pitched infantry battles. Notably, the Roman system of castra, or fortified camps, allowed the army to stay in the field on favourable ground and be rested and resupplied for battle. During the training exercise Roman legionaries would also be taught to obey their commanders and either the Republic or the Emperor. Clues exist in the earlier campaigns of Alexander the Great against mounted Asiatic warriors—engaging the horsemen with strong detachments of light infantry and missile troops and driving them off with charges by Alexander's heavy cavalry units. Occasionally villages and town would grow around these forts in order to suit the needs of the Limitanei. In the later imperial army, the general deployment was very similar, with the cohorts deploying in quincunx pattern. Rome's massive manpower supply enabled it to stay in the field and continue fighting after defeats and to launch new campaigns. Opponents could be relentlessly weakened and exhausted over the long run. Cohort IX: One of the four weak cohorts and a likely place to find trainees and raw recruits. Instead of vast formations of thousands of troops, smaller units would engage smaller-scale incursions by raiders. The systematic wastage and destruction of enemy economic and human resources were called vastatio by the Romans. [47], Some writers suggest that as a result of such debacles, the expanding Roman power began to adjust to this vigorous, fast-moving new enemy. [67] At Gergovia by contrast, Caesar's strength was divided by the appearance of another Gallic force in his rear (the Aeudans)- threatening his sources and lines of supply. Another formation was known as the pig's head. Indeed, the Macedonian commander, Perseus, seeing the situation deteriorating, seems to have fled without even bringing his cavalry into the engagement. The arrival of the two rear legions that had been guarding the baggage reinforced the Roman lines. FLAVIUS m Ancient Roman. Some weapons, such as the gladius, were adopted outright by the legionaries. Centurions commanded the Centuries. In addition, it is claimed, the "forward" policy was not at all a static "Maginot" approach, but that traditional heavy legions and supporting cavalry could still move to a trouble spot by redeploying them from fortifications elsewhere along a particular frontier.