The third issue that emerges from the debates about various reform possibilities is that of the tension between the formal and informal methods of institutional functioning. The Single Undertaking meant that all GATT Contracting Parties had to become members of the WTO. Fourth, on the subject of the Ministerial Conferences, the paper argues for less frequent Ministerials with a more specific agenda. Adequate time is hence still not available for planning, preparation and resource allocation. Whether one agrees with this assertion or not, the study of process in international institutions is of fundamental importance for two reasons. This can be a major problem in an IO like the WTO where there are about 1200 events through the year, often resulting in overlaps of meetings. Meanwhile, a more direct accountability of the WTO to its members, ie. Representation at all three levels is open to all members of the WTO. The numbers have only increased in the run-up to the fourth Ministerial conference. The most infamous in this genre were the Green Room meetings, where the Secretariat often treated the list of the invitees as confidential in order to avoid a flood of requests for participation from the excluded.19 The only way of tracing the proceedings of such meetings was through occasional briefings from the invited developing countries. De Gregorio, José, Barry Eichengreen, Takatoshi Ito, Charles Wyplosz, An Independent and Accountable IMF, Geneva Reports on the World Economy 1, International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies & Centre for Economic Policy Research, Geneva: ICMB, 1999. They shall refrain from any action which might adversely reflect on their position as international officials.’. However, as an inter-state body, it cannot replace the existing international hierarchies by more equitable structures. Others would have the WTO stop at nothing short of world government with legislation extending to labour, environment, gender issues and so forth. Similarly, while interest in long-term procedural matters is a healthy trend, the Secretariat too needs to guard against the risk of conducting discussions on procedural reform at the expense of fulfilling core and more immediate functions. Add the pressure for a new round with new issues to the already hard-pressed delegations negotiating the built-in agenda and attending to issues of implementation, reviews and notifications, and it becomes clear why many developing countries feel that they will be unable to participate unless support from the WTO Secretariat is forthcoming in various forms including, providing research and information and assistance in preparations for future meetings.18. Second, the decision to grant a temporary waiver to a member country from WTO obligations requires a similar three-fourths majority of the membership of the Ministerial Conference (Article IX:3). The "new issues" … It has been the contention of many Realist/ Neo-Realist theories of International Relations that process is merely the handmaiden of structural power. Eleven of the original 23 founding Contracting Parties of the GATT were developing countries. In cases where overlaps are inevitable, some interesting proposals have been put forth about establishing either joint panels 52 or a superior referral body.53 However, we are already in the realm of the speculative and long-term. WTO, General Council Informal Meeting (28 March 2000), Internal Transparency and the Effective Participation of all Members, Main Points raised by Delegations, JOB(00)/2331, 14 April 2000. In any case, there are political limitations on the extent to which the process of rule-making can be feasibly decelerated or even stabilised, especially as bargaining in the WTO involves interests of developed countries that have demanded legislation in newer areas. Section III deals specifically with proposals of institutional reform, and particularly reform directed to improving the participation of developing countries. Of the 132 members, 98 are developing countries, including 27 nations categorized as the least developed countries (LDCs). The result is that the power hierarchies outside get translated into the negotiating politics of the WTO, where the most powerful members (e.g. Also, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/about_e/resum01_e.htm. Some such informal consultations involve the entire membership of the WTO, e.g. NOVEMBER 2001. not simple majority, apply to three situations. International institutions can be viewed in two perspectives. All quotes delayed a minimum of 15 minutes. The key phrase here, however, is ‘if carefully and strategically used’ and as has been illustrated in the previous pages, reform of rules of the WTO can only go so far without destroying some of the benefits of the system. Ways of improving transparency and facilitating a more active engagement of developing countries has also been suggested. An important objective of the work programme is to respond, to the extent possible within the limited resources, to the needs of developing country negotiators in the WTO for concise and timely analytical inputs on selected key issues under negotiation in that organization. Today, the WTO presents a marked improvement to the GATT. In any case, more effort needs to be made to resolve most of the contentious issues in Geneva, before the Ministerial -- the extent of disagreement among all the major powers at Seattle contributed in no small way to the failure of the Ministerial and also dented the credibility of the WTO process. However, while decision-making processes remain largely unchanged, the mandate of the WTO is far more expansive and also goes much deeper than its predecessor’s. Debates have raged over the subjects of internal and external transparency of WTO processes, the accountability and legitimacy of the institution, and possibilities of institutional reform. In addition, one proposal from an NGO emphasises that the mandate of the small group must be specified and clearly delimited.43 This offers three advantages. The Like-Minded Group, formed at the time of the Singapore Ministerial, played a major role in highlighting the importance of implementation issues in the run-up to Seattle. Hence this paper argues that once the condition of transparency and openness of decision-making procedures is fully met and the consensus principle is modified, further institutional reform of any kind has to be minimalist. One of the strengths of the WTO is its dispute settlement mechanism. Members can decide to hold meetings among themselves, both within and outside the auspices of the organisation, to build coalitions and conduct research initiatives. Greater technical assistance from the Secretariat assumes expanded powers to the Secretariat, but if the technical advice of the Secretariat is already seen to be politically loaded and biased, should its powers of intrusion into domestic capacity-building be expanded? China and Liberia have since acceded to the WTO. IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSALS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM FOR THE CHARACTER OF THE WTO AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE. WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala on 9 March called on COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers to do more to ramp up production in developing countries to combat the vaccine supply shortage that is excluding many lower-income nations from access. the 'Asian way’ in the case of the East Asian financial crisis where restructuring included an assault on the chaebol and prompted a multitude of ‘IMF suicides’). Across regions and including LDC groupings, developing countries have emphasised that decision-making needs to be member-driven rather than board-led, and further that ‘the full participation of Members is fundamental to trust and confidence in the functioning of the Organisation as a Member-driven intergovernmental entity. This acknowledgement of limitations of processes at the domestic level presents a remarkable contrast to the dismissal of the GATT as a ‘Rich Man’s Club’ by developing countries in the past and their refusal to even try to participate on equal terms in the institution. Allegations of bias by the staff have been directed at different levels of the WTO’s workings, from the more administrative functions of organising meetings, assisting the chairperson in making lists of invitees, setting the agenda and publication of minutes after the meetings, to more substantial functions of giving legal and technical advice (on a case-by-case basis as well as through general technical assistance programmes). Second, if the process of functioning is transparent and accountable, the legitimacy of the organisation and the sustainability of its decisions increase substantially. The greater majority of developing countries has opposed the establishment of any executive body for consensus-building purposes, for indeed, the process of consensus-building is itself a crucial part of the decision-making process. However, other members can challenge the decision of a member to make use of provisions available to developing countries. First, process, in itself, in the form of rules and procedures (formal or informal), is a key determinant of the substance of power politics. Failing this, some advocate a race to the bottom for international legislation i.e. In part, this new responsibility that developing countries ascribe to the WTO -- and which the WTO too has taken on through its programmes of technical assistance -- is also understandable in terms of the potential capability of the staff. Decision-making processes are the most important of these methods of functioning against which the legitimacy of the institution may be rated because they show how the organisation treats its own members and thereby fulfils the first and most minimal level of accountability. The 146 member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are currently engaged in a round of trade negotiations. circumstances which favoured the group and are not easily reproducible). However, economic realities suggest that many of these countries have the capacity to take on fuller obligations. However, even the limited technical assistance programmes and legal advice by the WTO has already attracted criticism from developing countries on the grounds that it is biased and attempts to redefine their priorities irrespective of the ‘real’ needs of the governments.51 The expansion of the IFIs into ‘second generation’ reforms has demonstrated that good governance conditionalities privilege only certain kinds of good governments and rule-based orders, namely neo-liberal ones, and exclude alternative ways of governance (e.g. First, the nature of WTO legislation, i.e. The role of these informal processes is recognised even on the WTO website -- ‘Informal consultations in various forms play a vital role in allowing consensus to be reached, but they never appear in organization charts… They are necessary for making formal decisions in the councils and committees.’10 Informal consultations operate at each level of decision-making of the WTO. 22 (1), pp. For instance, the provision of one-member-one-vote is not enough. Suffice it to note at this juncture that the norm of using consensus as the basis of decision-making has meant that the rule of majority voting has never been used and possible majorities of developing countries remain unutilised. Finally, the equal representation that it allows to all its members and minimal powers to the Secretariat has led the WTO to evolve a fourth tenet of decision-making, namely a reliance on an elaborate network of informal processes that can beat consensus among 142 members into shape. All these are no small corrections, in themselves, and especially in the light of the deeply entrenched traditions of the Green Room. In August 1995, the South Centre became a permanent intergovernmental organization of developing countries. The top body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which meets every two years. Greater attention to issues of accountability might further improve the credibility of WTO decision-making and also increase the participation of developing countries.61 Reforms along the lines of creation of an Executive Board or expansion of the role of the Secretariat would not only institutionalise existing hierarchies but would also import new and deeper imbalances into the WTO at the expense of developing countries. 8 | The WTO web-site describes the main duties of the Secretariat as follows -- ‘to supply technical and professional support for the various councils and committees, to provide technical assistance for developing countries, to monitor and analyze developments in world trade, to provide information to the public and the media and to organize the ministerial conferences. Particularly since the pre-negotiation phase of the Uruguay Round, the concern of the GATT/WTO with non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade has involved increasing intrusion into areas of domestic legislation. Developing countries have expressed doubts with both the timing and content of technical assistance programmes in this context. In the discharge of their duties, the Director-General and the staff of the Secretariat shall not seek or accept instructions from any government or any other authority external to the WTO. Limiting the mandate of the WTO will work to the advantage of developing countries -- something that delegates have shown an acute awareness of through their emphasis on implementation issues and opposition to the new issues. However, most coalitions still have no institutional basis in the WTO comparable to the group system of the UNCTAD and the culture of secrecy surrounding informal meetings has not left the coalition diplomacy of developing countries untouched. It is to this dimension of WTO decision-making that we now turn. Besides the unworkable alternative of majority voting, two other possibilities remain. 3 Informal Processes in WTO Decision-Making. In remarks to an event hosted by the UK think tank Chatham […] Mexico has suggested a transformation of the Green Room into a ‘Glass Room’, in which 25% of the WTO’s members (34 at the time of the proposal) would participate. In this context, the ‘almost English Club atmosphere ... the codified language,’25 has made the Green Room consultative process daunting and inaccessible to some developing countries even if they are present. But here, the occasional, potential benefits of informality end and are confronted by a set of certain and perennial costs. While the onus of decision-making falls on the members themselves, the importance of informal procedures means that the Chairs at all levels have a major role to play in consensus-building. While capacity-building is at least as much a domestic issue as an international, institutional one, it has attracted considerable attention in the light of technical assistance programmes of the WTO. Knowledge and research might not completely overcome the problems of power political bilateral pressures that intimidate developing countries from exercising their voice in the consensus decision-making. Given that it is developing countries who would be the main targets of capacity-building efforts, they would also provide the arena for this deep intrusion. The third strategy for improving their participation in the WTO is one that developing countries have learnt the hard way. On comparing the rigid memberships and voting structures of the IFIs with the informally constituted and ad hoc Green Room hierarchies of the WTO, at least some advantages of informal decision-making processes become obvious. While some developing-country designations are proper, many are patently unsupportable in light of current economic circumstances. This new round is meant to focus on the needs of developing countries. the Quad). See Blackhurst et al (1999), and Stephenson (1994). Its membership should be representative of the differences in stages of development and interests of the member countries. 36 | My thanks to Rashid S. Kaukab and Sabrina Varma for extensive discussion on this. The WTO provides for a rules-based system to which 142 countries are bound. In fact, NGOs might be one of the few forces that can provide a balance against the corporate lobbies that sometimes drive the agenda of the WTO through the influence they exercise on the developed country governments. It seems simplistic to expect that many countries would find their interests adequately represented according to regional groupings in each issue-area. The reservations of developing countries regarding the GATT were only in part a product of the substance of the agreement.12 In good measure, they stemmed from decisions-making procedures that developing countries believed worked to exclude them. Hence, the second antidote, namely that of capacity-building, becomes crucial to deal with the overload of meetings and the possible increase if some of the proposals for greater transparency are met. However, the member-driven nature of the WTO places the onus of preparation and research for effective and active participation in the consensus-based decision-making procedures on the members themselves. The institution, by facilitating multilateral dealings and allowing the scope for coalition-building, mitigates some of the worst excesses of power politics. In contrast, the average size of the developing country delegation is 3.51. The origins of the consensus method of decision-making can be traced to the GATT. However, even this decisive vote was not used for the actual decision-making process to bring services within the purview of the GATT. Of course, one can hope that assuming developed countries prove willing to increase funding, technical assistance programmes of the WTO that give domestic and international trade policy advice to developing countries will be not only tailored to country requirements but will also be unbiased.